Prior to the Asian economic crisis in 1997, Singapore's official projected medium-term GDP growth target was set at 7 per cent per annum. Since then, the targeted growth rate has been reduced to 5 per cent. This paper examines the implications of the 5 per cent growth target on the labour requirements of the Singapore economy. It is shown that the projected resident labour force will not be able to keep pace with the increased labour demand and the share of foreigners in the labour force will increase significantly even under the most favourable scenario. Some implications of the increased dependence on foreign labour in Singapore are discussed. With permanent immigration fixed at the current level, various policy options and their effects on the demand for foreign labour are considered. These include improving labour productivity, raising total fertility rate, increasing labour force participation of older workers and lowering the targeted rate of economic growth.
Introduction
Singapore had been dependent on the inflow of immigrants to support the growth of the economy from the early years of its development. Since its founding in 1819 until the mid 1950s, the former British colony's free immigration policy had attracted large numbers of migrant workers, boosting population growth and increasing the pace of economic development. Starting from a small population base, the immigration-augmented growth in the colonial years did not generate much controversy or concern among the residents of the island economy. Between 1901 and 1957 for example, net immigration to the colony totaled about 722,000 (Chiew [1995] ) enabling the population to reach 1.63 million in 1960. With self government and independence in the 1960s, immigration continued to be a major contributor to population and economic growth in Singapore, albeit at a slower pace as the colonial free immigration policy was replaced by a selective immigration policy favouring the permanent migration of skilled and educated manpower and the temporary stay of lower skilled foreign labour. Immigration controls on foreign labour take the form of work passes with differing residency conditions, restrictions on the sectors allowed to employ foreign labour, levies on the employment of lower skilled foreign guest labour and ceilings on the proportion of such workers in a firm. 1 . 1 Foreign manpower is admitted under two broad categories -work permit holders and employment pass holders. Work permit holders are lower-skilled workers who earn less than S$2,500 a month. They are normally granted renewable short-term permits of two-years to work in Singapore and their employers pay the foreign worker levy. Employment passes are granted to skilled workers who possess tertiary or professional qualifications and paid a monthly salary in excess of S$2500. Employment pass holders are eligible to apply for permanent residence in the country for themselves and their families. The national policy towards skilled foreign manpower has always been one that promotes free entry for those who with requisite skills and educational qualifications.
Since 1967, the rate of increase in Singapore's indigenous labour force has followed a downward trend. This reduction in labour force growth is consistent with the experience of most developed and developing economies confronted with the problem of declining fertility rates and an ageing population. The total fertility rate for females aged years in Singapore has trended downwards from 5.76 in 1960 to 1.37 in 2002. Prior to 1975, the growth in labour force was due solely to the growth of the indigenous workforce. With declining fertility rates as a result of successful population planning measures implemented from late 1960s through the 70s, the contribution of the indigenous population to labour force growth has fallen significantly ( Table 1) . The reduction in domestic labour supply growth has been offset to some extent by a corresponding increase in female labour force participation. While the participation rates of men had remained relatively steady, the increase in female labour force participation from 29. Prior to the Asian economic crisis in 1997, Singapore's official projected medium-term growth rate was set at seven per cent. Since then, the targeted growth rate has been placed at five per cent in the medium-term. Given the diminishing rate of growth of the indigenous labour force, there are legitimate concerns whether this might seriously limit the future economic growth of the economy. And if the targeted growth rate is to be achieved, it is instructive to investigate the extent of dependence on foreign labour in the future. With these labour force trends and constraints in mind, this paper seeks to estimate economy-wide labour requirements based on the medium term targeted five per cent growth rate, and compare these against domestic labour force projections. The extent to which the resident labour force can satisfy labour requirements and the resulting demand for foreign labour is estimated. We assess the potential of various policies to reduce Singapore's reliance on foreign labour. This is the first study, to our knowledge, that provides a quantitative assessment of the projected demand for foreign labour and the potential of various policies in moderating this demand. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 a model of demand for labour is estimated and used to project labour demand in next thirty years. Section 3 projects the supply of resident labour using a component model under different demographic assumptions. These projections are used to estimate the demand for foreign labour in Section 4. In Section 5 we discuss the effects of immigration in Singapore and the reasons for moderating the future inflow of foreign labour. Section 6 examines various policy options and their impact on foreign labour demand. Concluding remarks follow in Section 7. 2 Statistics on the actual number of foreign workers in Singapore had always been classified as State secrets.
PROJECTED DEMAND FOR LABOUR

Data
In an unprecedented move in response to a public controversy over the impact of foreign labour on job prospects, the government in August 1993 released data on year to year changes in the stock of foreign workforce for the period 1993 to 2002.
Basic statistical tests to ascertain the time series properties of these series have shown that all these log-series are integrated of order one and that a co-integrating relationship exists among these series 3 .
Using the level of employment as the demand for labour, we estimated a simple reduced form model of demand for labour 4 with employment determined by output and wage costs.
Various regression variables and their lagged values are included in the preliminary estimations using the ordinary least squares method and the following model is finally chosen on the basis of economic theory and standard diagnostic tests 5 : (Johansen [1991 (Johansen [ , 1995 ) to test the null hypothesis of no co-integrating equation against the alternative of one co-integrating equation, we are able to reject this hypothesis at 1 per cent level of significance under both trace and maximum Eigen-value tests. In addition, test of the null of one cointegrating equation against the alternative of two shows that there is not enough evidence to reject this hypothesis at 1 or 5 per cent levels of significance. 4 We do not attempt to present an elaborate model of labor demand here. Interested readers are referred to the following comprehensive works by Beenstock [1988] and Hamermesh [1993] . 5 These include, inter alia, various tests on residuals, value of the likelihood and values of Akaike Information Criterion and Schwartz Bayesian Criterion.
annualized rate of growth of real GDP and real monthly earnings has been around 2 per cent ( Table 2) . The actual employment and the projected employment by the model from 1974 to 2034 are reported at five-year intervals in Table 3 . The model predicts an annualized growth rate of 2.9 per cent in employment and an implied annual productivity growth of about 2 per cent. 
PROJECTED SUPPLY OF RESIDENT LABOUR
The projected supply of resident labour for the same period is estimated using the approach outlined below.
Methodology
Despite extensive research, estimated models of labour supply remain poor in their forecasting performance 6 . The reason is that most of these models are based on labour supply as a function of labour income and variables such as taste, family composition and other socioeconomic characteristics. However, from a forecasting point of view it is almost impossible to provide accurate expected values of these variables. As a result, such models, while very useful in explaining the structure of the labour supply, are of little use for forecasting.
For forecasting purposes, a better approach is to extrapolate the past trends in population and labour force participation rates into the future, making certain assumptions about birth rates, life expectancy at birth and immigration. This approach has been used to project Australia's labour force (ABS [1999] ). In Singapore, the key variables which influence labour supply are population growth and immigration (Pang [1985] ). Our projection of the labour force involves three stages. In the first stage, population projections are obtained (by age and sex) after making certain assumptions about birth rates, death rates and net immigration. In the second stage, labour force participation rates (LFPRs) are extrapolated subject to certain ceilings and floors. Finally, the population and LFPR figures are 6 Once again our objective is not to present a formal model of labour supply. Interested reader is referred to Killingsworth [1983] which provides an extensive survey of the research on modeling the supply of labour.
combined to obtain the projected labour force. A total of eleven different sets of assumptions are used for the projections. Details of the methodology can be found in Hashmi and Hui [2002] .
Out of the eleven scenarios, the following three 7 have been selected for our analysis: Scenario A reflects a pro-immigration stance with a gradual increase of the current intake and assimilation of foreign skilled immigrants over the next five decades. Scenario B describes a status quo policy while scenario C corresponds to a tough immigration stance with complete curtailment of inflow of permanent immigrants complemented by pronatalist policies to maintain the fertility rate at the current level.
Plausibility of Assumptions under three Scenarios
The TFR in Singapore has gradually been declining since 1960 (see Table 4 ). In the ten years from 1989, the TFR has declined from 1.75 to 1.48 despite the package of incentives to encourage families to have more children under the New Population Policy Actual immigration figures are not publicly available in Singapore. Data on resident population, births and deaths for the last ten years have therefore been used to estimate the extent of permanent immigration. These estimates are shown in Table 5 9 . The three scenarios reflect three possible options on immigration: to let the immigration increase as in scenario A; to maintain immigration around its current level as in scenario B and finally, the hypothetical extreme case of a complete curtailment of immigration in scenario C. Singapore has always maintained a liberal policy towards permanent migration of skilled manpower. Recognition of the crucial role of human capital to generate growth and to create wealth in the knowledge economy has led to several national initiatives 10 to make Singapore an attractive destination and to extend the reach for foreign talents.
Recent initiatives such as the promotion and development of Singapore as a regional education hub and the review of citizenship privileges are part of the continual efforts directed at inducing more foreigners to take root in Singapore. Given this, it is therefore not unreasonable to expect the level of net permanent immigration to be sustained or increased in the future. Table 6 presents the projections for Singapore's local labour force in next three decades.
Projection Results
Under the pro-immigration scenario A, the resident labour force will grow from 1.75 million to 2.60 million in the next thirty years at an annualized average growth rate of 1.32
per cent. With the status quo scenario B, the resident labour force will grow at a lower annual growth rate of 1.08 percent to 2.42 million over the same period. Under the anti-immigration scenario C, the labour force will increase for the first ten years and then decline thereafter. The net result is that the resident labour force size will almost be the same in 2025 as in 2004. The results also show that under all three scenarios, the average annualized labour force growth rate will initially decline over the next 25 years. This is primarily due to the aging population and the below replacement level of TFR 11 .
Increasing immigration can partially offset this fall but the effect will only be felt after 2025. When we compare these labour force growth rates with a 2.9 per cent average annual growth rate in labour demand, it is apparent that there will be an increasing gap between labour demand and the resident labour supply. 
PROJECTED DEMAND FOR FOREIGN LABOUR
The demand for foreign labour (D FL ) is computed as the difference between total employment (EMP) and the employed local labour force (LLF EMP ).
The projected local labour force under the three scenarios in Table 6 refers to the available labour and ignores any unemployment. To correct for this, a resident unemployment rate of 3 per cent for the entire projection period has been assumed. This gives Table 7 shows this projected foreign labour demand under three scenarios and the share of foreign labour in total employment. The demand for foreign labour is expected to grow under all three scenarios. Under scenario A, it will increase fivefold from an estimated 
EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION IN SINGAPORE
Economic Effects of Immigration
Economic theory posits that international migration will confer benefits to the host country in the form of an immigration surplus representing an increase in national income accruing to the natives (Borjas [1995] ). However, there are also fiscal and income redistribution effects of immigration in the host country to contend with. Wildasin [1994] shows that free immigration which increases the costs of income redistribution may lead to Paretoinferior outcomes. Michael [2003] shows that, in the presence of international capital mobility, immigration can have a positive effect on national welfare by reducing the loss to workers while increasing the welfare of capitalist. Empirical research by Simon [1996] argues that immigrants in the US tend to pay quantities of taxes that exceed the costs of the public services they receive and hence immigration confers positive fiscal benefits to the host country. Storesletten [2000] finds that net public gain of a marginal immigrant varies with age and skill where high-skilled immigrants generate the highest net public gain, followed by medium-and low-skilled immigrants. Net public gain is potentially highest for middle-aged immigrants and declines for older and younger age groups while the contribution of low-skilled immigrants is almost always negative. Ideally, it would be very interesting to explore the above issues for Singapore. However, the unavailability of immigration data does not allow us to proceed along this route.
Instead, we will provide a qualitative discussion on some of the impacts of immigration in Singapore which could justify the need for caution on future immigration.
Immigration Issues in Singapore
From the economic planner's viewpoint, the availability of a ready supply of foreign manpower is considered an important attraction of foreign investment which has provided the impetus to growth and job creation since the 1970s. The argument for the continued presence of a significant foreign labour force is also predicated on their important role in maintaining our competitive edge through supplementing domestic labour supply and skills and moderating wage increases during economic expansion. The stock of foreign labour also acts as an employment stabilising buffer during downturns when their outflow would shield locals from job displacement. There are also jobs shunned by locals which foreign workers help to fill.
When the economy recorded strong growth and jobs were plentiful in the 1980s and 1990s, public concerns about the increased presence of foreigners were initially directed mainly at the social issues of foreign housing enclaves, overcrowding and excessive consumption of public amenities and impact of foreign workers, particularly domestic maids, on the values acquired by younger generations of Singaporeans (Teng [1997] ).
With the growing presence of foreign labour, other issues came into focus. These include the negative impact on productivity growth from maintaining a rotating group of lower skilled foreign guest workers; increased income inequality arising from wage depression at the lower end of the wage distribution; increased incidence of illegal immigration 12 and costs of enforcement measures; risks of escalating property prices in the land-scarce city state; the political hurdles of cultivating national identity in the face of an influx of foreigners and an increased emigration tendency among citizens (Hui [2002] ).
The persistence of structural unemployment of older and lower educated workers is also a major concern. With economic restructuring following the Asian economic crisis, the slowing down of job creation and the ensuing significant rise in resident unemployment skilled manpower. While temporary overseas employment stints by citizens contribute to the accumulation of invaluable human capital and overseas contacts to further the nation's globalization efforts (Hui [1998] ), the possibility of a permanent drain of the local talent pool is a real concern. With increased influx of foreigners, the real or perceived labour market disadvantage of local employees relative to the enlarged foreign talent pool could possibly induce more citizens to seek permanent employment overseas.
It may therefore be argued that for social, economic and political reasons, there are justifiable concerns about the desirability of having a large foreign workforce in
Singapore. In the following section, we will explore how the projected excessive dependence on foreign labour could be reduced under various policy initiatives.
POLICY OPTIONS FOR REDUCING DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN LABOUR
Improving Labour Productivity
The implied annualized productivity growth for the different scenarios is about 2 per cent.
A pertinent question concerns whether productivity growth could be increased to reduce the dependence on foreign labour. To answer this, it is instructive to study the productivity performance of the Singapore economy over the past two decades. Table 8 shows that the share of labour productivity growth in total economic growth has consistently declined over the past two decades. The implied annualized labour productivity growth of 2 per cent over the next three decades is consistent with the productivity share of GDP growth remaining at the existing 40 per cent level. However, it could be argued that with the advent of the knowledge-driven economy, productivity growth could possibly increase beyond the projected 2 per cent level. Indeed, the productivity growth experience of the developed economies such as USA, UK and Switzerland (Table 9) suggests that the productivity performance of the Singapore economy could be improved to reduce the employment growth needed to sustain the targeted growth of the economy. With a GDP growth target of 5 per cent, an increase in the productivity share of GDP growth to 60 per cent would imply a one-percentage point improvement in annualized productivity growth to 3 per cent. The simulation shows that this would consequently almost halve the demand for foreign labour from 2.78 million to 1.48 million in 2034 (Option I Table 10 ). The share of foreign workers in total employment at 38.6 per cent is much lower than the 54.2 per cent under the original projection.
A rise in the productivity growth rate is by no means the certain direct result of policy initiatives. It is the unpredictable product of a multitude of factors which include, among others, the cultivation of a competitive business environment, an efficient infrastructure, appropriate fiscal incentives to induce work effort, flexible and dynamic industrial structures to encourage investments in leading high value-added products, a quality trained workforce and improved workplace practices. The promotion of international outsourcing of lower-skilled service activities which could enhance productivity (Gorg and Hanley
[2003]) may also be relevant for labour-strapped Singapore. 
Increasing Total Fertility Rate
It may be argued that with better incentives and renewed efforts by the authorities, the total fertility rate could possibly be raised to replacement level of 2.1. To analyse the impact on foreign labour demand, we simulated a gradual increase of the TFR from its current level to 2.1 in 2019. The projected impact on foreign labour demand is shown under option II of Table 10 . As expected, any perceptible impact of the increased fertility rate on labour supply will only be felt after 20 years. Given the 30 years projection horizon, the decrease in demand for foreign labour is not substantial.
The prospects of increasing the TFR are not promising given the rising trend of dualcareer families, delays in marriages and child rearing (Cheung [1999] ). The decline of TFR to 1.37 in 2002 is an indication that the recent government's Baby Bonus policy initiated in 2000 may not have worked 17 . Even if TFR is increased, it may be offset by a decline in the labour force participation of women in the childbearing age groups and engender an increase in dependence on foreign labour, especially for foreign domestic helpers which in 2003 accounted for about 140,000 of the foreign workforce in Singapore.
Increasing Older Worker Labour Force Participation
The prospect for increasing labour supply through higher labour force participation of prime age working persons is limited. In arriving at the labour force projections we have extrapolated the age specific trend of labour force participation rates (LFPRs) by gender, with ceilings (floors) based on the highest (lowest) participation rates of countries such as Germany, Sweden, Japan and Hong Kong. Table 11 shows the binding restrictions imposed on the LFPRs for the different age groups. Although no ceiling is binding for males aged 40-54 years, the projected LFPR for this group is already relatively high ranging from 95 per cent to 98 per cent. The prospect of expanding labour supply through a further increase in LFPR for this group is therefore limited. However, the same cannot be said for those in the age groups from 55 to 69 years.
The labour force participation of older persons in Singapore is relatively low compared to countries like Japan and Sweden. For example, in 1999, Singapore's labour force participation rate for those aged 55 to 59 years was 72.9 per cent and 27.9 per cent, for males and females, respectively (Table 12 ). The corresponding figures for Japan in 1999
were 94.7 per cent and 58.7 per cent.
With the expected raising of the Singapore's statutory retirement age 18 from the present 62 to 67 years in the future, the higher educational attainment of the labour force and the greater emphasis on lifelong learning and training, it is not unreasonable to expect that labour force participation rates of older persons may increase over time. To determine the effect on labour supply of an increase in LFPR of older persons, we assume that their LFPR will increase to reach Japan's 1999 level in 2019. Figure 1 shows the effect of this change on the projected LFPR. The effect on demand for foreign labour is presented under option III of Table 10 . The demand for foreign labour is projected to reach 2.51 million or 48.9 per cent of total employment in 2034. Although this is less than our benchmark under scenario B, the difference is not substantial. knowledge obsolescence which no longer justifies the higher cost of retaining them. This is reflected in the deterioration of the employability of older workers over the past three decades. Table 13 shows that while the share of older workers in employment has risen with the ageing population, joblessness among older workers has increased disproportionately over time. The increase in the share of older workers in unemployment is especially pronounced following economic downturns such as the post-1997 period.
Recent measures implemented to increase the employability of older workers include the reduction in employer's Central Provident Fund (CPF) contribution rates for workers aged 55 and above 19 , the promotion of the competitive performance-based wage system to replace the seniority-based wage system, general assistance for retraining of older workers and targeted wage support schemes such as the People for Jobs Traineeship Programme (PJTP) to assist older workers in making career transitions across industry.
The combined effect of all three options on the demand for labour is also shown in Table   10 . The simultaneous achievement of all three policy objectives would allow the size of the foreign labour force to be lowered to reasonable levels. 
Reducing Targeted Growth Rate
The growth potential for Singapore has been subject to downward revision over the years in response to changing regional and global developments. Prior to the Asian economic crisis in 1997, the official pronouncement of the medium term growth potential was 6 to 7 19 The employer's CPF contribution rates for workers aged 55 and above has been cut since 1988. The employer's contribution rates, effective since 1 October 2003, are 6 per cent, 3.5 per cent and 3.5 per cent for those aged 55-60 years, 61-65 years and above 65 years, respectively. The employer's contribution rate for those below 55 years is 13 per cent.
per cent 20 . This was been subsequently revised downwards to 4 to 6 per cent in the postcrisis period. A recent official forecast predicts growth of between 4 to 5.9 per cent over the next decade (MTI [2002] ). Given the matured economy, the resource constraints and using the recent growth experience of other developed economies as a guide, it could be argued that a more sustainable long-term growth for Singapore should be less than 5 per cent. To study the effect of a lower targeted growth on labour requirements, we derived the labour demand projections with the growth rate set at 4 per cent. The option IV column of Table 10 shows the demand for foreign labour when real GDP is simulated to grow at 4 per cent and real average monthly earnings at 3 per cent. Under these assumptions there is a substantial reduction in the demand for foreign labour. However, this result is sensitive to assumed growth rate of real earnings. The option V column of Table 10 shows the demand for foreign labour under a 4 per cent real GDP growth and 2
per cent real earnings growth. The demand for foreign labour is much higher compared to the higher real earnings growth under option IV and slightly lower than our benchmark case. The higher wage costs provide incentives for firms to employ more skillful workers with higher productivity and therefore lowering the number of workers demanded.
The decision on a suitable economic growth target essentially involves the choice of a growth path that would maximize the welfare of its population. In Singapore's case, real GDP per capita (at 1995 prices), has risen by almost four times in the past 3 decades from about S$10,900 in 1974 to S$40,000 in 2000. The impact of the lower 4 per cent growth on real GDP per capita is shown in Table 14 . A lower growth rate would result in a real GDP per capita which will be $5000 or 5.5 per cent less in 2034. While GDP per capita is a common measure for comparing economic performance, it also has weaknesses as an indicator of living standards. In this instance, it does not take into account non-pecuniary factors such as the 1.6 million fewer foreign workers. In an island state with an already very high population density of 6,000 per sq km, the fourth highest in the world, it might be argued that the lower growth target path could in fact provide a higher standard of living in Singapore. 
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analysed the implications of a 5 per cent economic growth target on labour requirements in Singapore's economy. Our analysis shows that even on the basis of optimistic projections of our future resident labour supply, more foreign labour on a significant scale will be needed to bridge the excess demand for labour. The expected size of this foreign labour ranges from 2.6 to 3.6 million workers, constituting 51 to 71 per cent of the projected total workforce. This study has established that in addition to facing a demographic aging problem in next few decades, Singapore will also face the problem of excessive dependence on foreign workers.
Four possible avenues to reduce the dependence on foreign labour have been explored.
Increasing TFR is the least effective while increasing labour force participation rate of older persons could reduce the demand for foreign labour by up to 21 per cent. The most promising option appears to be to increase the productivity level and/or to reduce the targeted rate of growth for the economy. Raising productivity would be the most desirable option, however its achievement could be elusive as past experience shows that there may not be any definite correlation between policy efforts directed at increasing productivity and the actual productivity outcomes. Lowering the targeted growth rate involves a deliberate decision to reduce the growth of GDP per capita and is clearly a viable policy option within the control of policy makers. This, coupled with the appropriate wage growth policy, will serve to moderate the nation's dependence on foreign labour to sustain economic growth in the new millennium. A major challenge for policy makers in the decades ahead is to tread the fine line between promoting economic competitiveness through foreign labour augmentation and protecting the economic wellbeing of its citizens.
